fix(pipelines): prevent arbitrary file read and path traversal in /files endpoint - #11247
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Summary of Changes
This pull request resolves a path traversal and arbitrary file read vulnerability in the pipelines REST API
/filesendpoint (slm/pipelines/rest_api/controller/file_upload.py).Problem
In the previous implementation of
download_file,os.path.join(FILE_PARSE_PATH, file_name)was used directly without path sanitization or boundary verification. Supplying absolute paths (e.g.,/etc/passwdorC:\Windows\win.ini) or directory traversal sequences (e.g.,../../file) causedos.path.jointo discardFILE_PARSE_PATHor traverse outside the intended directory.Solution
os.path.basename(file_name).abs_targetstarts withabs_base + os.sep(whereabs_base = os.path.abspath(FILE_PARSE_PATH)).file_namecontains path traversal attempts or resolves outsideFILE_PARSE_PATH, raiseHTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid file name").os.path.isfile) are returned viaFileResponse.slm/pipelines/tests/test_file_upload.pycovering valid file downloads, default filename behavior, absolute path traversal attempts, relative directory traversal, and non-existent files.We welcome feedback from the maintainers on this implementation!